Trapped in the Baltics
Francis Fukuyama, a consultant at the Rand Corporation, is author of "The
End of History and the Last Man."
The plight of the 25 million Russians outside of Russia has become a
foreign policy concern of President Boris Yeltsin's Government. In this
issue are the seeds of another crisis more dangerous than the breakup of
Yugoslavia.
Estonia has passed and Latvia has proposed discriminatory citizenship laws
requiring Russians, as well as other ethnic minorities, to go through a
difficult naturalization process during which they cannot vote, own
property or hold certain jobs.
These policies may be understandable for historical reasons, given Baltic
fears of being overwhelmed by the Russians, nevertheless, discrimination
is discrimination; many Russians have become victims, and the Russian
Government is understandably upset.
At the United Nations in September Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's pro-Western
Foreign Minister, criticized Estonia for violating the human rights of
Russians. And in October, the Yeltsin Government halted troop withdrawls
from the Baltics to put pressure on local governments to respect
Russians' rights. In Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan, Russians have
killed and been killed in ethnic vilence. Increasingly, they are arming
themselves in self-defense.
The instincts that served us well during the cold war may be inappropriate
now. It is natural for American and Europeans to side with the Baltics
and other captive nations that suffered under the yoke of Russian and
Soviet imperialism. But the human right principles underlying U.S.
foreign policy do not extend to support for efforts to create ethnically
or racially homogeneous nations.
More important, as a purely practical matter, Latvian and Estonia are tiny
communities on the border of the world's largest contry. It's
unrealistic for them to expect protection from the the U.S. or the
European Community; they will have to find a way to live with Russia in
the long run. It is hard to see how Latvia and Estonia can expect to
disfranchise half their population and remain viable, stable and
democratic countries.
To be sure, Moscow's motives in championing the rights of Russians abroad
are in many cases highly suspect. Some officials, such as Vice President
Aleksandr Rutskoi, are not entirely reconciled to the loss of empire and
would like to use local Russians populations as a means of winning back
the country's hegemony.
But many other Russians are sincere democrats who supported Baltic
independence two years ago and feel betrayed by the Baltics' reneging on
promises to treat their minorities fairly. It is senseless to hand
would-be fascists in Russia an easy issue with which they can attack Mr.
Yeltsin and dicredit his close relationship with the West.
Under these cirsumstances, the U.S. must take an unprejudiced and
evenhanded position, supporting the rights of all ethnic minorities in
the region, including Russians. This might mean applying pressure on
Baltic and the other post-Soviet govermenets to liberalize their
citizenship and permanent residency laws, even as we continue to press
Russia to withdraw its forces from the former Soviet republics.
Aid and trade to these states should be conditioned not just on economic
reform but also on human rights. George Kennan's suggestion that aid be
used to build housing for Russian servicemen being brought home from the
Baltics and elsewhere is a good one for the incoming Clinton
Administration.
With the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin, a lifelong Soviet bureaucrat,
as Prime Minister, the Russian Government is more likely to provoke a
crisis with the Baltics over the rights of ethnic Russians. But the big
explosion is in the future, if Ukraine moves away from its liberal
policies on rights and citizenship toward nationalist conformity.
Unlike the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the one in the ex-Soviet
states will present the Clinton Administration with not just a moral but
a major geoplitical problem. Russia could intervene against the Baltics
or, worse, confront Ukraine over the right of Russians in Crimea. Let us
hope that our tragic reluctance to become involved in Yugoslavia will not
be repeated in the case of the former Soviet Union.
